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THE NLRB AND THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS:
A PROPOSAL FOR A PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICE SETTLEMENTS
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act)' promotes harmony
within labor relations and protects collective bargaining rights2 by prohibiting unfair labor practices. 3 Parties resolve a large majority of unfair labor
practice disputes by either formal or informal settlements. 4 Formal settlements require approval of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or
Board) and may provide for a circuit court of appeals order. 5 Informal
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1982).
2. National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 362-63 (1940).
3. Section 8 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982), sets forth a detailed description of activities
which constitute unfair labor practices. Section 8(a) details activities by employers and § 8(b) lists
activities by employees or unions which constitute unfair labor practices. In addition, § 7 of the Act
grants employees "the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ....
" 29 U.S.C. § 157.
4. See 47 NLRB ANN. REP.-1982, at 278-79 (1986). In fiscal year 1982, 9817 or 27% of the
36,424 unfair labor practice cases the Board closed involved settlements. Of these, 9677 cases were
disposed by informal and 140 by formal settlement. Additionally, 12,671 or 34.8% of the cases closed
were terminated by withdrawal of the charging party. Id. Of the 6096 cases closed which regional
directors had found meritorious-and thus in which they had issued complaints-3982 or 65.9% were
disposed of by settlement agreement. Id. at 278-79, 28 1. An additional 596 or 9.8% were disposed of
by withdrawal. Id. at 278-79.
Settlement agreements bar subsequent litigation of all presettlement conduct except when specific
exceptions are met. Wallace Corp., 323 U.S. at 254; Leeward Nursing Home, 278 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at
58-59, 122 L.R.R.M. 1350 (1986); Hollywood Roosevelt Hotel Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 1397, 1397 (1978)
(settlement disposes of all presettlement matters unless prior violations are unknown to General
Counsel, not readily discoverable by investigation, or specifically reserved by mutual understanding of
parties).
5. NLRB Statements of Procedure, Series 8, 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.9, 101.14 (1985). Unfair labor
practice cases must be initiated by an aggrieved party filing a charge with a regional director, who acts
as the General Counsel's representative. 29 C.F.R. § 101.2. The regional director conducts an
investigation to determine whether the charge of an unfair labor practice has merit. If the regional
director finds merit in the charge, a complaint is issued against the respondent. 29 C.ER. § 101.8.
Unless settled, the case proceeds to litigation. 29 C.F.R. §§ 101. 10-. 14.
A settlement may be agreed upon by the regional director and the charging party together with the
respondent. In addition, either the regional director or the charging party may enter a unilateral
settlement with the respondent. 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.7, 101.9. If a charging party disagrees with a
settlement entered by the regional director, the party has the right to file a list of objections with the
regional director, the General Counsel, or the Board specifying the reasons for disagreement. 29 C.F.R.
§§ 101.7, 101.9. The charging party also has the right, in some circuit court jurisdictions, to a hearing
before the Board. See Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 357 F2d 527, 535-36 (3d Cir. 1966); Retail
Clerks Union 1059 v. NLRB, 348 F.2d 369, 370 (D.C. Cir. 1965). A decision by the Board to approve a
settlement over the charging party's objection gives the charging party the right to judicial review before
a federal court of appeals as an aggrieved party under § 10 of the Act. RetailClerks, 348 F2d at 370; 29
U.S.C. § 160(f) (1982).
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settlements require approval by a regional director. 6 A high settlement rate
is critical to the Board's ability to function; indeed, settlements have been
7
called the "lifeblood of the agency."
In deciding whether to approve formal settlements, the Board stringently
reviews the substantive terms of the settlements. 8 As part of its stringent
review policy, the Board presumes that a respondent is guilty of the unfair
labor practices alleged by a charging party. 9 The Board withholds its
approval when settlements do not implement the full statutory remedy. 10
The full remedy would normally be available to a charging party only if an
administrative law judge or the Board upheld all allegations against a
respondent in an adjudicatory process.
This Comment will show that the Board's policy of stringent review of
the substantive terms of formal settlements is contrary to the purpose of the
NLRA. The policy discourages and causes rejection of settlement agreements.II In addition, the policy is inconsistent with the negotiation process 12 and with other Board policies. 13
As an alternative to its present policy of stringent substantive review, this
Comment proposes that the Board implement a procedural fairness standard of review. 14 This proposed standard would further the purposes of the
NLRA and would provide for a realistic degree of review in terms of the
negotiation process. 15 Moreover, the Board could more efficiently process
6. NLRB Statements of Procedure, Series 8, 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.7, 101.9 (1985).
7. Community Medical Serv. of Clearfield, Inc. (Clear Haven II), 239 N.L.R.B. 1244, 1245 n.5
(1979) (Penello & Murphy, Members, dissenting). In their Clear Haven II dissent, Members Penello
and Murphy stated that without the 82.2% settlement rate for unfair labor practice cases in 1978, the
Board's operation would have been seriously impaired and its effectiveness severely, if not irremediably, impeded. Id. The Board has a longstanding policy of encouraging settlements. Wallace Corp. v.
NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1944): 3 NLRB ANN. REP. 20 (1938); 2 NLRB ANN. REP. 15 (1937); 1
NLRB ANN. REP. 30 (1936); see also General Counsel Memorandum 78-41. July 6, 1978, in LABOR
RELATIONS YEARBOOK-1978, at 328-29 (1979); Fanning, The Role of the Hearing Examiner in the
Settlement of Formal Complaints by the National Labor Relations Board, in LABOR RELATIONS
YEARBOOK-1967, at 324 (1968).
The Board's current backlog of unfair labor practice cases underscores the importance of settlements.
See LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK-1984, at 329 (1985) (record Board backlog as of December I,
1983). In fiscal year 1982, the Board received 38,097 new unfair labor practice cases. 47 NLRB ANN.
REP.-1982, at 260. At the close of the year, 23,525 cases remained pending. Id. The median length of
time to litigate an unfair labor practice case from the time a party filed a charge to the issuance of a
Board decision as of fiscal year 1982 was 633 days. Id. at 317. The median age of unfair labor practice
cases pending Board decision in fiscal year 1982 was 456 days. Id.
8. See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 33-51 and accompanying text.
I1. See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 123, 133-40 and accompanying text.
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its caseload and parties would have greater freedom to settle unfair labor
practice disputes. 16
I.

BACKGROUND TO NLRB'S CURRENT SETTLEMENT
POLICY

A.

Purpose of the NationalLabor Relations Act

Section 1 of the NLRA states that the Act's purpose is to remove
obstacles to interstate commerce by reducing industrial strife through
encouraging and safeguarding the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining.17 The theory underlying the Act is that free opportunity for
negotiation with accredited representatives of employees is likely to promote industrial peace and may bring about agreements which the Act does
not attempt to compel. 18 Promotion of industrial peace lessens the adverse
economic effects resulting from obstruction of commerce due to acrimonious relations between management and labor. 19
The Act requires employers, employees, and labor organizations to
recognize one another's legitimate rights. 20 The Act's enforcement provisions provide remedies for parties that have their rights infringed by unfair
labor practices. Remedying such practices, however, is a means of accomplishing the Act's more fundamental end of promoting industrial peace by
protecting and encouraging the collective bargaining process. 2 1 Thus, the
policy behind the Act is to promote settlement of unfair labor practice
disputes whenever a settlement provides for fast, peaceful resolution of a
labor dispute.
B.

The Board'sPresentPolicy of Substantive Review of Settlement
Agreements

The Board determines the adequacy of a settlement by asking whether
the settlement effectuates the Act's policies. 22 The Board makes certain
16. See infra notes 124-32 and accompanying text.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982); see H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103 (1970). The Act is
designed to channel labor struggles into constructive, open discussions leading to mutual agreement.
The Board's role is to supervise and referee the procedure ofcollective bargaining, leaving the results of
the contest to the bargaining strengths of the parties. Id.; see also Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S.
248,254 (1944) (the Act is designed to resolve, and to extinguish as far as possible all elements giving
rise to, labor conflicts).
18. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937); see also NLRB v. Fansteel
Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 258 (1939) (the purpose of the Act is to promote peaceful
settlement of disputes by providing legal remdies for the invasion of employees' rights).
19. Fansteel, 306 U.S. at 257.
20. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,177 (1967); R. COULSON, How To STAY OUT OF COURT 169 (1968).
21. See supra note 18.
22. Service Merchandise Co., 278 N.L.R.B. No. 23, at 3 n.2, 121 L.R.R.M. 1179 (1986).
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that the Act's statutory objectives and policies are not subsumed by the
desire to achieve settlements. 23 The Board's procedures require that settlements substantially remedy the alleged unfair labor practices and not be
24
contrary to the public interest.
1.

Board's Presumption of a Meritorious Case and Requirement of
Full Statutory Remedies

In implementing its standard of stringent review, the Board employs a
presumption that the regional director has a meritorious case and that
respondents are guilty of alleged unfair labor practices. 25 The result of the
presumption is that the Board assesses the sufficiency of a settlement by
determining whether charging parties receive the full measure of statutory
remedies they would receive if respondents were proved guilty of the
26
alleged unfair labor practices.
The Board originally applied the presumption only to post-trial settlements after an administrative law judge found a respondent guilty. 27 However, in later cases the Board extended the presumption to settlements that
occurred before parties were found guilty of committing unfair labor
practices.28
23. District Council 47, AFSCME, 274 N.L.R.B. No. 203, at 2, 118 L.R.R.M. 1567 (1985).
24. NLRB Statements of Procedure, Series 8, 29 CF.R. §§ 101.7, 101.9 (1985).
25. Community Medical Serv. of Clearfield, Inc. (Clear Haven Nursing Home), 236 N.L.R.B.
853, 855-56 (1978), reh'g denied, 239 N.L.R.B. 1244 (1979); Bioff, "Capitulate or Litigate"-The
Labor Board's Settlement Policy and the Objectives of the National Labor Relations Act, 47 UMKC
L. REV. 289, 292 (1979).

26. See Teamsters Local 115 (Gross Metal Products), 275 N.L.R.B. No. 220, 120 L.R.R.M. 1041
(1985); Carpenters 46 N. Cal. Counties Conference Bd. (Arntz Contracting), 274 N.L.R.B. No.181,
118 L.R.R.M. 1588, later proceeding, 277 N.L.R.B. No.30,121 L.R.R.M. 1030 (1985); ClearHaven
Nursing Home, 236 N.L.R.B. at853. Ineach of these three cases, the Board rejected settlements based
on the failure
toaward full
statutory remedies.
27. See, e.g., Jack C. Robinson (Robinson Freight Lines), 117 N.L.R.B. 1483 (1957). Robinson
Freight Lines concerned a post-trial settlement situation involving the discharge of 12 employees. The
settlement terms provided for far less than the remedy the administrative law judge had awarded. The
judge had ordered reinstatement with backpay forfive
workers and backpay fortwo others; the
settlement provided forreinstatement of sixworkers without backpay. Only one of the workers for
which the settlement provided reinstatement was among those whom the judge ordered reinstated. Id. at
1486; see also Retail Clerks, Local 1288 (Nickel's Pay-Less), 163 N.L.R.B. 817, 817 n.1,820 (1967)
(Board rejected post-trial
settlement after
reversing hearing examiner's decision by finding that
clauses
contained inacollective bargaining agreement were illegal
since persons towhom the clauses applied
were not employees); Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 121N.L.R.B. 1492, 1495 (1958) (Board
disapproved settlement when itdetermined on remand from circuit
court that
discharged employees
were engaged inan unfair labor practice strike
and thus they were entitled
tofull
reinstatement without
prejudice). But see Central Cartage Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 337,338 (1973). InCentral Cartage, the Board
approved a settlement reached after
the administrative law judge's decision forthe respondent. The
Board relied
solely on the actions of the parties
inarriving atafull,
final,
and complete settlement of the
dispute.
28. See Arntz Contracting, 274 N.L.R.B. No. 181, at 2 (Board employed presumption that party
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2.

Board's Rationalefor Settlement Approval Requirements

The Board has justified stringent substantive review of settlements by
reasoning that the Act promotes the public interest and not the interests of
private parties.2 9 The rights infringed by unfair labor practices are public
and not private rights. In addition, the Board has reasoned that under
section 10 of the Act it has exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute unfair labor
practice cases; 30 therefore, private parties cannot settle without its approval. The Board has found that allowing parties to commit unfair labor
practices, and then to avoid possibly harsh remedies by settling, might
encourage future violations. 3 1 The Board has stated that employees should
not subsidize their employers' unfair labor practices by accepting less than
32
adequate settlements.
C.

Recent BoardDecisionsApplying a Substantive Review Standard

In recent years, the Board has affirmed its policy of stringent review of
settlements' substantive terms. In Community MedicalServices of Clearfield County, Inc. (ClearHaven Nursing Home), 33 the Board rejected a
was guilty of alleged unfair labor practices although settlement and review process occurred prior to
hearing on the merits); ClearHaven Nursing Home, 236 N.L.R.B. at 855-56; cf. Sabine Towing &
Transp. Co., 224 N.L.R.B. 941 (1976) (deferral to pretrial settlement pursuant to arbitration inappropriate since no Board approval or determination of legality of individual's discharge); Farmers CoOperative Gin Ass'n, 168 N.L.R.B. 367 (1967). In FarmersCo-Operative, the Board approved a pretrial settlement which provided for reinstatement of all but two employees, one of whom had been
accused of a threat against a foreman so serious as to warrant the refusal to reinstate him. Id. at 367-68.
The Board concluded that the amount awarded in backpay by the settlement was reasonable given the
risks of litigation, the certainty of delay in payment to the employees, and the effectiveness of the
remedy coupled with a court decree. The Board's test for reviewing the settlement was whether the legal
and factual merits disclosed by the administrative investigation so clearly proved the allegations that no
remedy less than the maximum could be accepted, which the Board answered in the negative. Id. at
367.
29. See ClearHavenNursing Home, 236 N.L.R.B. at 853-54; Nickel's Pay-Less, 163 N.L.R.B. at
817 n. 1; Winston & Mary Louise Rose (Ideal Donut Shop), 148 N.L.R.B. 236,237 (1964); Ingalls Steel
Contr. Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 584,584 n. 1 (1960);RobinsonFreightLines,117 N.L.R.B. at 1485; see also
Nelson, The Clearfield Medical Services Case: "Effectuating the Policies of The Act" Or "Shortsighted,PettifoggingInsistence UponLitigation"?,29 LAB. L.J. 643 (1978); Whipple, "Capitulateor
Litigate"-TheLabor Board's Settlement Policy and the Objectives of the NationalLabor Relations
Act-A Reply, 47 UMKC L. REv. 309 (1979).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982). Section 10(a) of the NLRA states that the Board's power to prevent
unfair labor practices "shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has
been or maybe established by agreement, law, or otherwise ..
"See Texaco, Inc., 273 N.L.R.B.
1335, 1335 (1985); E.L. Wiegand Div., Emerson Elec. Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 1143, 1149 (1979); Clear
Haven Nursing Home, 236 N.L.R.B. at 853.
31. Clear Haven Nursing Home, 236 N.L.R.B. at 853 (approval of settlements which fail to
remedy unfair labor practices encourages rather than deters future unlawful conduct).
32. Id.
33. 236 N.L.R.B. 853 (1978), reh'g denied, 239 N.L.R.B. 1244 (1979).
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settlement that provided for a collective bargaining agreement and reinstatement of striking workers. An administrative law judge had previously approved the settlement. Among the alleged unfair labor practices
were the employer's unilateral termination of an existing health plan,
failure to furnish relevant information, refusal of employees' unconditional
offer to return to work, and threats of retaliation against employees. 34 The
Board refused to approve the settlement because it neither gave employees
notice of their rights nor provided backpay to striking workers; thus, the
settlement did not provide the full statutory remedy for the alleged prac35
tices.
The Clear Haven dissent found that settlement approval would have
minimized economic dislocation for the employer and employees by bringing an end to a strike that had kept employees out of work for a significant
length of time. 36 The dissent observed that the parties negotiated the wage
rate provided by the settlement with employees' backpay expectations in
mind. 37 The settlement also would have promoted the overarching purpose
of the NLRA-the alleviation of industrial strife through furtherance of
38
collective bargaining.
Two recent Board decisions rejecting settlement agreements illustrate
the Board's adherence to the ClearHaven policy of a stringent substantive
review standard. The first case, Carpenters46 Northern CaliforniaCounties Conference Board (Arntz Contracting),39 involved an extremely disruptive labor dispute including secondary boycott and recognitional picketing charges. 40 In Arntz Contracting,the General Counsel, ten respondents,
and thirty-two of forty charging parties agreed to settle ninety out of an
original 178 unfair labor practice cases. 4 1 Only one charging party was
34.
35.
36.

Clear Haven Nursing Home. 236 N.L.R.B. at 853.
Id. at 854-55.
Id. at 858 (Penello & Murphy, Members, dissenting).

37.

Id. at 859.

38. Id.
39. 274 N.L.R.B. No. 181, 118 L.R.R.M. 1588, later proceeding, 277 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 121
L.R.R.M. 1030 (1985). The Arntz Contracting dispute was subsequently settled under a modification of

the original agreement which the Board approved. Carpenters 46 N. Cal. Counties Conference Bd.
(ArntzIl), 277 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 121 L.R.R.M. 1030 (1985). The Board found the differences between

the original and subsequent agreements significant enough to justify approval of the later settlement. Id.
at 3 n. 1. The Board announced no change in the standard it would apply in deciding whether to approve
settlements. See Service Merchandise Co., 278 N.L.R.B. No. 23, at 2 n.3, 121 L.R.R.M. 1179 (1986)
(subsequent to Arntz 11, Board rejected settlement upon which charging party and respondent had
agreed because substantive terms did not effectuate policies of Act).
40. Arntz Contracting, 274 NLRB No. 181, at 4 (Dennis, Member, dissenting); Dennis, A
Principled Approach to NLRB Decisionmaking, I LAB. LAw. 483, 486 (1985).
41. Arntz Contracting, 274 N.L.R.B. No. 181, at 4-5 (Dennis, Member, dissenting). The parties

had resolved 88 previous unfair labor practice charges by informal settlements approved by the regional
director. Id. at 4 n.2.
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unwilling to enter the settlement agreement at the time of Board consideration. The Board rejected the agreement based on the recidivist history of
certain respondents, the nature of the violations, and the practices encompassed by the settlement. The dissent pointed out that the Board's position
directly contradicted its earlier decision in the J.P.Stevens & Co. cases, 42 in
which the Board approved a settlement involving an employer with a
reputation as the "most notorious recidivist" 43 in labor law. The dissent
argued that litigating the dispute would exacerbate the parties' relationship
and promote further industrial strife. 44
In the second case, Teamsters Local 115 (Gross Metal Products),45 the
Board rejected a unilateral settlement agreement between the General Counsel and the respondent union. 46 The employer, as charging party, objected to
the General Counsel's approval of the settlement. 47 The employer alleged
and an administrative law judge upheld charges of picket line violence by
striking employees directed at the employer and at employees of other businesses. The Board found that the settlement would inadequately remedy the
alleged practices. 48 The dissent thought the Board should have approved the
settlement. 49 The dissent found negligible difference between the settlement
and the remedies demanded by the Board. 50 The settlement contained an
order which prohibited violence against the charging party or any employer
doing business with the charging party. The Board provided a broader order
which prohibited violence against businesses at facilities other than the
charging party's. 5 1
D.

JudicialReaction to the Board's CurrentSettlement Review Policy

Courts of appeals rulings indicatejudicial second-guessing of the Board's
substantive review standard. At least one court has denied enforcement of a
42. 268 N.L.R.B. 8, 11,33, 58, 60, 63, 89 (1983). In the J.P.Stevens cases, the Board found that a
comprehensive settlement was the best means of breaking up a longstanding pattern of recidivism. See
Dennis, supra note 40, at 486. In the press release announcing the J.P.Stevens settlement agreement,
Chairman Dotson hailed the agreement "a milestone in the history of labor relations" and stated that "it
demonstrates that the resolution of labor management disputes need not reside in the litigation
process." Id.
43. J.P. Stevens & Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 407,413 (1979), vacated, J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 458
U.S. 1118 (1982) (citing NLRB v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 563 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977)).
44. Arntz Contracting,274 N.L.R.B. No. 181, at 7 (Dennis, Member, dissenting).
45. 275 N.L.R.B. No. 220, 120 L.R.R.M. 1041 (1985).
46. Id. at 1.
47. Id. at 6 (Dennis, Member, dissenting).
48. Id. at 2.
49. Id. at 6 (Dennis, Member, dissenting).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 6 n. I (Dennis, Member, dissenting).
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Board order based on rejection of a settlement. 52 A second court remanded a
case with the directive that the Board give a satisfactory explanation for its
rejection of the settlement. 53 These courts have pointed to the public and
private interests in approving settlements. 54 They have also held that the
Board cannot presume a respondent guilty of an unfair labor practice until an
55
administrative law judge has so found.
II.

ANALYSIS OF THE BOARD'S PRESENT POLICY OF
SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW

Reviewing the substantive terms of unfair labor practice settlements is
inconsistent with the purpose of the NLRA. The Board's arguments for
substantive review are not persuasive. In addition, substantive review
disserves public and private interests. Substantive review is also inconsistent with the negotiation process and with other Board policies.
A.

HistoricalChanges Make PastJustificationsfor Substantive Review
Invalid

Substantive review of unfair labor practice settlements may have been
beneficial early in the NLRA's history. However, reasons which previously
existed in support of substantive review are no longer valid. The initial
belief was that under the Act, Congress intended to give the Board exclusive jurisdiction over adjudication of labor disputes. 56 If parties could
not obtain remedies via Board processes, they would be unable to obtain
redress elsewhere. The Board has not, however, developed such exclusive
jurisdiction. Parties are able to obtain remedies for labor grievances
52.

Roadway Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 415, 426 (4th Cir. 1981). In Roadway Express, the

court denied enforcement of a Board order when the Board disapproved a settlement which occurred
after an arbitration panel had split four to four. The court observed that the employee acquiesced to the
settlement for four weeks without complaint and that the settlement was not repugnant to the Act. Id.
53.

Hotel Holiday Inn v. NLRB, 723 F.2d 169 (lst Cir. 1983); see also NLRB v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc.,

730 F.2d 119, 124 (3d Cir. 1984) (court questioned the Board's rejection of settlement, though noting
that the Board's action was not a question specifically appealed). But see Oil. Chemical and Atomic
Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, Nos. 85-1459, 1740,23 L.R.R.M. 3129 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 2, 1986) (court
denied enforcement of order approving settlement when Board did not explain departure from Clear
Haven standard, employees settled without union approval); Airport Parking Management v. NLRB.
720 F.2d 610, 616 (9th Cir. 1983) (court upheld Board disapproval of settlement where record did not

consider merits of an unfair labor practice claim).
54. Roadway Express, 647 F.2d at 426.
55. Hotel Holiday Inn, 723 F.2d at 172.
56. Peck, A Proposalto End NLRB Deferralto theArbitrationProcess,60 WASH. L. REv. 355, 361
(1985).
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remedies also
through other federal and state law remedies. 57 Alternative
58
Board.
the
than
other
agencies
federal
under
exist
Additionally, the Board adopted its settlement approval requirements
when a concern existed that employees with unequal bargaining positions
relative to employers should receive the protection of the Act. 59 Concern
about unequal bargaining positions, however, prevailed when labor unions
were in early stages of their development. Since the initial passage of the
NLRA, unions have significantly increased their bargaining power in labor
negotiations. 60 Moreover, union negotiators now are generally very experienced; thus, they are fully as capable of judging 61the adequacy of a
settlement as either a regional director or the Board.
The Board also adopted a policy of reviewing settlements' substantive
terms when it could more easily process its caseload. Currently, the Board
processes many more cases than when it first set forth a substantive review
policy. 62 It is unlikely that the Board could foresee the burden that would
eventually be placed on its resources. Nor could the Board have anticipated
the length of time it would take parties to resolve unfair labor practices
now wait years to obtain remedies
through Board processes. Parties must 63
via litigation for unfair labor practices.
57. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185-86 (1967) (an unfair labor practice in front of the Board
could also be subject of suit for breach of duty of fair representation under § 301(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982)); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195,
197,201(1962) (unfairlaborpractice could be subject ofstatecourt suit forbreach ofcollective bargaining
agreement); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960) (unfair
labor practice could be subject of arbitration proceeding since arbitration of labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements is part and parcel ofcollective bargaining process); Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957) (section 301(a) allows suit for breach of contract between
employer and labor organization to be brought in any federal district court having jurisdiction over the
parties).
58. Other agencies include the Department of Labor and the Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission. Peck, supra note 56, at 361.
59. SeeNLRB v.J. Weingarten, Inc.,420 U.S. 251,262(1975) (Actdesignedtoeliminateinequality
ofbargaining powerbetween employers and employees); Garnerv. Teamsters Local Union 776,346 U.S.
485,497 (1953) (one purpose of NLRB to remedy inequality of bargaining positions between parties); 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1982); R. COULSON, supra note 20, at 169-70.
60. NLRB v. InsuranceAgents'Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477,496n.27 (1960);R. CoULsON,supranote
20, at 173-74, 178; Cox, TheDuty to Bargainin Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1401, 1440-41 (1958).
61. Community Medical Serv. of Clearfield County, Inc. (Clear Haven Nursing Home), 236
N.L.R.B. 853, 859 (1978), reh'g denied, 239 N.L.R.B. 1244 (1979) (Penello & Murphy, Members,
dissenting) (employees are adults who, with assistance oftheirunion representatives, are well qualified to
make decisions affecting their future); R. COULSON, supranote 20, at 168-69.
62. In fiscal year 1937, the Board received 3124 unfairlabor practice cases. 2 NLRB ANN. REP. at 19
(1937). In fiscal year 1942, the Board received 3409 unfair labor practice cases. 7 NLRB ANN. REP. at 18
(1942). In fiscal year 1982, the Board received 38,097 new unfair labor cases. 47 NLRB ANN. REP.1982, at 260 (1986).
63. See supra note 7. The median length of time to litigate an unfair labor practice dispute is nearly

Washington Law Review
B.

Vol. 62:107, 1987

The Board's Presumption of a Meritorious Case and Resulting
Requirement of Full Statutory Remedies Are Flawed

The Board's presumption that the regional director's case is meritorious
and the resulting requirement of full statutory remedies fail to withstand
critical analysis. 64 The presumption erroneously relies on the truth of all
unfair labor practice allegations, since it overlooks claimants' possible

inability to succeed on the merits. 65 Experience proves that regional directors fail to sustain allegations either at the hearing before an administrative
law judge or on appeal before the Board. 66 Furthermore, the presumption is
contrary to the reality of the complaint issuance process, since regional
67
directors rely solely on a reasonable cause standard in issuing complaints.

In addition, the presumption that respondents are guilty of unfair labor
practices predetermines rejection of settlement agreements that deviate

from full statutory remedies. The Board rejects agreements even if they are
based on a genuine compromise which leaves the parties in a better position
68
than if they had they fully litigated a dispute.
two years. This figure in most cases understates the time involved because it includes disputes which have
received special, accelerated treatment. See Carpenters 46 N. Cal. Counties Conference Bd. (Amtz
Contracting), 274 N.L.R.B. No. 181 at 6, 118 L.R.R.M. 1588, laterproceeding,277 N.L.R.B. No. 30,
121 L.R.R.M. 1030 (1985) (Dennis, Member, dissenting) (unfair labor practice dispute resolution via
litigation takes up to five years). The damage to industrial peace from prolonged litigation is directly at
odds with the Act's original purpose. Delays result in the continuation of labor disputes and thus have a
negative impact on industrial harmony. Id. at 7; see also infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text
regarding the negotiation process.
64. The Board's presumption is directly opposite the presumption it employs in duty offair representation cases. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 570-71 (1976) (employee in breach of
duty of fair representation case has burden to show discharge was contrary to contract, as well as union's
breach of duty); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 195 (1967) (breach of duty of fair representation by union's
settlement short of exhausting contractual remedies not established merely by proving that underlying
grievance was meritorious).
65. NLRB v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 730 F.2d 119,124 n. 1(3d Cir. 1984); see alsoHotel Holiday Inn v.
NLRB, 723 F.2d 169, 172 (1st Cir. 1983) (at time of settlement employees' right to reinstatement was
contingent on finding that employees were illegally fired); Hotel Holiday Inn, 278 N.L.R.B. No. 147, at
6, 121 L.R.R.M. 1273 (1986).
The Board's position may be justified in cases where a hearing examiner has found a party guilty of
alleged violations. See, e.g., Jack C. Robinson (Robinson Freight Lines), 117 N.L.R.B. 1483 (1957)
(post-trial settlement disapproved when respondent found guilty at hearing). ButseeTeamsters Local 115
(Gross Metal Products), 275 N.L.R.B. No. 220 at 7, 120 L.R.R.M. 1041 (1985) (Dennis, Member.
dissenting) (hearing examiner and Board erred in considering whether respondent was guilty or innocent
since judgment of guilt should be made after and not before assessing the adequacy of a settlement).
66. Bioff, supra note 25, at 292.
67. Bioff, supra note 25, at 293; cf Community Medical Serv. of Clearfield, Inc. (Clear Haven
Nursing Home), 236 N.L.R.B. 853, 858 (1978), reh'g denied, 239 N.L.R.B. 1244 (1979) (Penello &
Murphy, Members, dissenting); NLRB Statements of Procedure, Series 8, 29 C.F.R. § 101.8 (1985).
68. See, e.g., Clear Haven Nursing Home, 236 N.L.R.B. at 857 (Penello & Murphy, Members,
dissenting) (settlement included collective bargaining agreement, providing parties with better remedy
than they could possibly have obtained through litigation).
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The Board's current policy also reduces the incentive for regional
directors to reach formal settlements. Instead, regional directors have a
motive to arrive at informal settlements, which do not require Board
approval. 69 Informal settlements have inferior enforcement mechanisms
relative to formal settlements. In the event informal settlements are
breached, the sole remedy is setting aside the settlement. 70 In contrast,
71
parties may obtain court of appeals decrees to enforce formal settlements.
Violation of a decree provides grounds for contempt proceedings. 72 Repeated violations of a formal settlement order provide a basis for a perma73
nent, broad order against a respondent.
C. The Board'sLegal Justificationsfor Substantive Review Are Flawed
The Board's legal reasons for reviewing the substantive terms of settlements are flawed. The public interest justification on which the Board has
relied does not sustain substantive review of unfair labor practice settlements. The public rights protected by prevention of unfair labor practices
may be better served by a settlement agreement than by rejecting the
settlement. 74 Moreover, it is unreasonable to require a private party to
initiate enforcement of a public right, and then to deny it the power to settle
because the regional director has issued a complaint. 75 Since an unfair labor
practice injures a private party, that party is in the best position to deter76
mine whether a settlement adequately remedies the injury.
The Board has cited Supreme Court decisions which state that the
NLRA's provisions against unfair labor practices are in the public interest. 77 However, these cases fall into two patterns which are distinguishable
69. Carpenters 46 N. Cal. Counties ConferenceBd. (ArntzContracting), 274 N.L.R.B. No. 181, at
9, 118 L.R.R.M. 1588, laterproceeding,277 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 121 L.R.R.M. 1030 (1985) (Dennis,
Member, dissenting).
70. 29 C.F.R. § 101.9(e)(2) (1985); see Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
71. Arntz Contracting,274 N.L.R.B. No. 181, at 6 (Dennis, Member, dissenting); see also Farmers
Co-Operative Gin Ass'n, 168 N.L.R.B. 367, 368 (1967).
72. See Arntz Contracting, 274 N.L.R.B. No. 181, at 6 (Dennis, Member, dissenting); see also
Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261 (1940).
73. Arntz Contracting,274 N.L.R.B. No. 181, at 6 (Dennis, Member, dissenting).
74. See Texaco, Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. 1335, 1336 (1985) (public rights stated in Act better served by
upholding strike settlement agreement than by disregarding it).
75. See infra note 90 and accompanying text regarding leverage. A party may have no choice but to
file an unfair labor practice charge to force an opposite party to negotiate.
76. Community Medical Serv. of Clearfield, Inc. (Clear Haven Nursing Home), 236 N.L.R.B. 853,
859 (1978), reh'g denied, 239 N.L.R.B. 1244 (1979) (Penello & Murphy, Members, dissenting).
77. See, e.g., Hotel Holiday Inn, 278 N.L.R.B. No. 147 at4, 121 L.R.R.M. 1273 (1986) (citing
National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940)); E.L. Wiegand Div., Emerson Elec. Co., 246
N.L.R.B. 1143, 1149 (1979) (Board refused to deferto a settlement agreement because the Board acts in
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from consideration of private settlements. First, cases hold that private
parties lack standing to sue directly based on the NLRA. 78 Second, cases
involve proceedings in which the remedies for the alleged practices might
interfere with rights of third parties. 79 These lines of cases hold that public
rights enforced in unfair labor practice proceedings take precedence over
rights asserted by private parties. They do not address the issue of whether
the Board should approve private parties' settlement of unfair labor practice
80
disputes.
In addition, the Board's statements of procedure regarding settlements
give rise to a presumption that unfair labor practice settlements should be
approved absent a positive showing that a settlement is contrary to the
public interest. The procedures state that parties shall have full opportunity
for settlement "except where ...
the public interest do[es] not permit"
(emphasis added). 81 Rules of statutory construction dictate that a party
seeking to establish an exception to a general policy has the burden of

proof. 82
D.

The Board's Policy Is Unrealisticin Terms of the Negotiation
Process

Substantive review is also unrealistic in terms of the negotiation process.
The Board's approach deters parties from reaching settlements and is
inconsistent with the dynamics of negotiating settlements.
1.

Substantive Review Deters Partiesfrom Reaching Settlements

Parties have reason to settle when settlements place them in better or
potentially better positions than if they litigated their disputes. 83 Settlements reduce the uncertainty and risk entailed in going to court. 84 By
the public interest to enforce public not private rights) (citing J.I. Case v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944);
NationalLicorice,309 U.S. at 350; Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S.
261 (1940)).
78. See, e.g.,AmalgamatedUtil. Workers, 309U.S. at270 (circuitcourtofappealshasnojurisdic-

tion to enforce court decree at suit of private parties since NLRA creates public rights).
79. See NationalLicorice, 309 U.S. at 360; J.1. Case, 321 U.S. at 337.
80.

The Supreme Court did address the issue of whether the Board could set aside settlements in

Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944). The Court held the Board could do so when postsettlement violations occur.
81. NLRB Statements of Procedure, Series 8, 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.7, 101.9 (1985).
82.

See 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.11, at 14 (Sands rev. 4th ed.

1984) (one who claims exception to prohibition under statute has burden of proof).
83.
(1981).

R. FISHER & W. URY, GETrING TO YEs-NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 73

84.

SeeHotel Holiday Inn v. NLRB, 723 F.2d 169,172-73(1983) (uncertaintiesofadversary hearing

include competence of counsel, thoroughness of preparation, memory and availabiltiy of witnesses, and
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settling, the parties may obtain at least those concessions which are most
important to them. 85 Settlements also save parties the time and expense of
86
litigation.
87
The Board's policy eliminates the incentive to negotiate settlements.
The Board's policy requiring full statutory remedies prevents a charging
party from accepting a compromise at less than full remedies. Therefore,
the charging party must uncompromisingly insist that it receive all remedies to which it might be entitled. The Board's approach also inhibits the
respondent from negotiating. Only remedies that implement the full statutory remedy will pass muster before the Board. Such settlements result in
the most unfavorable result possible for the respondent. The respondent
thus has nothing to lose and everything to gain by litigating. 88
The Board's policy forces parties to take a hard approach to resolving
unfair labor practice conflicts. The parties' self-interest motivates them to

include competence of counsel, thoroughness ofpreparation, memory and availabiltiy of witnesses, and
attitude of hearing officer); Carpenters 46 N. Cal. Counties Conference Bd. (Arntz Contracting), 274
N.L.R.B. No. 181, at8, 118 L.R.R.M. 1588, laterproceeding,277 N.L.R.B. No. 30,121 L.R.R.M. 1030
(1985) (Dennis, Member, dissenting) (risk inherent in litigation that parties claims may not succeed on
merits); see alsoP. HERMANN, BETTER SETTLEMENTS THROUGH LEVERAGE § 2:1, at 9 (1965) (uncertainty
is the most effective device one can use to increase or decrease settlement values); C. PECK, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON NEGOTIATION 151-52 (2d ed. 1980). Uncertainty stimulates bargaining when parties fear
that the alternative to an agreement will entail greater economic harm than the agreement.
85. See R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 83, at 73-76.
86. Court costs may be so high, or a party's time so valuable, that the party is willing to make
concessions in exchange for a fast resolution. See R. COULSON, supra note 20, at 20-24 (1968).
87. Rejection of settlements casts doubts on the efficacy of any agreement that deviates from the
remedy the Board might grant. If no deviation is permitted, parties can gain little ornothing by negotiating
in an attempt to achieve settlement of disputes. Cf. Combustion Engineering, 272 N.L.R.B. 215, 217
(1984) (upholding voluntarily negotiated agreements encourages parties to resolve disputes without
resort to Board processes); C. BELL, NEGOTIATION FROM STRENGTH 220-21 (1963) (true negotiation
occurs when parties put forward propositions within bargainiig zone, between optimal and minimal level
of hopes with respect to settlement); N. JACKER, EFFECrIvE NEGOTIATION TECHNIQUES FOR LAWYERS 77
(1982) (parties have no reason to negotiate if bargaining position is too strong or too weak); C. STEvENS,
STRATEGY AND CoLLECIvE BARGAINING NEGOTIATION 11 (1963) (if a remedy is not within a manifest
contract zone which is preferred by both parties to no agreement, the only possible outcome of negotiations is no agreement).
88. See P. HERMANN, supranote 84, § 2:1, at 10. Ifaparty demands all that is possible, the result is to
insulate the other side from uncertainty and thus to create an incentive not to settle. If, on the other hand, a
party offers less than the full remedy possible, the other side must fully consider the offer since it may
obtain less at trial. See Hotel Holiday Inn; 723 F.2d at 173 (if Board's policy is to reject settlement
agreements solely because they do not provide all that employees might ultimately have obtained by
litigation, the Board has removed any incentive for the employer to bargain); Teamsters Local 115 (Gross
Metal Products), 275 N.L.R.B. No. 220, at 7, 120 L.R.R.M. 1041 (1985) (Dennis, Member, dissenting)
(approval of settlement based on guilt or innocence of respondent removes incentive for respondent to
enteragreement); cf.Vacav. Sipes, 386U.S. 171,192-93 (1967) (ifunion's decision that grievance lacked
merit constituted unfair labor practice merely because jury later found grievance meritorious, union's
incentive to settle grievances would be seriously reduced).
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take positions at opposite extremes. The result is a lower rate of settlement
89
and longer time to reach agreement.
2.

Substantive Review Is Inconsistent with the Dynamics of the
Settlement Process

A substantive review approach is inconsistent with the dynamics of the
settlement process. The Board's policy overlooks the importance of filing
an action to acquire leverage to force an opposing side to undertake good
faith negotiations. 90 Under the Board's current policy, if a party files a
charge and the respondent is unwilling to settle at full remedies, the
charging party may not settle the case. The end result may be to deter a
party that does not want to engage in the time and trouble of litigation from
filing its initial charge.
In addition, the Board's policy has failed to consider that an important
function of settlements is to generate goodwill between parties. 91 For
example, in Teamsters Local 115 (Gross Metal Products),92 the Board
rejected a settlement because it contained a nonadmission clause. 93 The
Board overlooked that settlements often include symbolic gestures such as
nonadmission clauses with the intent to foster goodwill. 94 Rather than
generating ill will by publicly announcing the employer or union guilty of a
past unfair labor practice, the clauses facilitate amicable settlements by
95
promoting harmony and signifying a peaceful resolution of conflict.
89. Cf R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 83, at 5-8, 21 (positional bargaining produces unwise
agreements, is inefficient, and places relationship and substance in conflict); N. JACKER, supra note 87. at
88-90 (hard bargaining strategy is effective only if a party is under pressure to settle, while soft approach
leads to higher frequency of settlements as well as speedier agreements); Effects ofBargaining Strategy.
30 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 458 (1974) (the harder the approach parties take to bargaining, the
smaller the chance of reaching agreement-and the longer the time needed to reach agreement).
90. R. CoUt.soN, supra note 20, at 50; P. HERMANN, supra note 84, § 4:6, at 132, § 6:4. at 223.
91. N. JACKER, supra note 87, at 2. Settlements generate good will by enabling both sides to a dispute
to save face; unlike the situation in an adversarial trial setting, neither party emerges a loser. See R. FISHER
& W. URY, supra note 83, at 30. Harmony between adverse parties is especially important in the labor
relations context since the parties have an ongoing relationship. See C. PECK, supra note 84, at 214-15.
92. 275 N.L.R.B. No. 220, 120 L.R.R.M. 1041 (1985).
93. The nonadmission clause at issue stated that respondent union members were not guilty of
engaging in alleged illegal acts of picketline violence. Gross Metal Products, 275 N.L.R.B. No. 220, at
3-4. The hearing examiner found and the Board majority agreed that in light of uncontested findings of
strike misconduct, such a clause would make a "mockery of law enforcement." Id.
94. See R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 83, at 32-33.
95. Cf NLRB v. Bangor Plastics, 392 F.2d 772,775 (6th Cir. 1969) (settlement does not amount to
finding ofunfair labor practice, thus nothing inappropriate in statement that notice pursuant to settlement
admits no wrongdoing); Carlsen Porsche Audi, Inc., 266 N.L.R.B. 141, 151 n.19 (1983) (settlement
agreements did not constitute admission by employer that it committed unfair labor practice).
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The Board also acts inconsistently with the negotiation process in its
approach to late-hour settlements. The Board has rejected late-hour settle96
ments because they would not significantly save Board resources. This
reasoning overlooks that settlements necessarily occur at late hours because parties must thoroughly review the relative strengths and weaknesses
97
of their positions before they can ascertain their likelihood of success.
E.

Substantive Review Is Inconsistent with OtherBoard Policies

Substantive review of settlements is inconsistent with other Board policies. First, substantive review is inconsistent with the Board's policy of
deferral to arbitration. 98 The Board defers to arbitration with no substantive
review of either the merits of unfair labor practice charges or the remedies
provided by arbitration awards. 99 The Board adopted a policy of deferral
based on the conviction that parties to a collective bargaining agreement
are in the best position to resolve disputes concerning the agreement. 100
Deferral also avoids the prolongation of labor disputes consequent to
litigation and promotes industrial harmony. 10 1
96. See, e.g., GrossMetalProducts,275 N.L.R.B. No. 220, at 3-4. According to the dissent, the
majority's reliance on the settlement's timing was contrary to prior precedent. Id. at 7 (Dennis, Member,
dissenting) (citing J.P. Stevens & Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 11 (1983); United Mine Workers (James Bros. Coal
Co.), 191 N.L.R.B. 209 (1971)).
97. Parties are not in a good position to determine the adequacy of a settlement before engaging in
discovery and some degree of negotiation with the opposing side. See P. HERMANN, supra note 84,
§§ 3:1-:4 (knowledge of facts and law required for parties to succeed in settlements); McConnell,
Settlement Negotiations, I PRAc. LAW. 36 (1955) (thorough preparation of own side and study of opponent's side engender grasp of case's strength or weakness that is all but indispensable in deciding its
value).
98. Board deferral to arbitration is of two types: first, Collyer deferral, which occurs prior to an
arbitrator's decision; and second, Spielberg deferral, which occurs after an arbitrator has reached a
decision. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192N.L.R.B. 837 (1971); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112N.L.R.B. 1080
(1955). The Board has rejected application of the Spielbergdoctrine as a mandate that administrative law
judges should defer to informal settlement agreements. Owens Coming Fiberglas Co., 236 N.L.R.B.
479,479n.4 (1978);T&Tlndus.,235N.L.R.B. 517,517n.2(1978) (nobasis forBoardto defer toprivate
resolutionofgrievanceshortofarbitrator'saward); SabineTowing&Transp. Co., 224N.L.R.B. 941,941
(1976) (no basis for deferral to informal settlement pursuant to grievance procedure). But see infra notes
102-03 and accompanying text.
99. International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923,923-24,927 (1962), aff'd, Ramsey v. NLRB,
327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964); see alsoHines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424
U.S. 554, 563 (1976). The requirements for arbitration deferral are that the proceeding appear to be fair
and regular; that the parties agreed to be bound; that the arbitrator's decision is not "clearly repugnant" to
the purposes of the the Act; and that the arbitrator has considered the unfair labor practice issue and ruled
onit.Spielberg, 112N.L.R.B. at 1082;RaytheonCo., 140N.L.R.B. 883,884(1963),setaside, Raytheon
Co. v. NLRB, 326 F.2d 471 (Ist Cir. 1964).
100. United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557,558 (1984).
101. See R. COUILSON, supranote 20, at 190 (genius of labor arbitration is that controversies can be
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The distinction between awards made by arbitrators pursuant to grievance procedures and negotiated settlements does not justify applying
different standards of review.10 2 Voluntary settlement is as adequate a
means as arbitration for resolving unfair labor practice disputes. 103 Parties
may shape arbitrations by agreeing on the issues to be resolved. Similarly,
parties in settlement negotiations can shape agreements to resolve charges
satisfactorily and to obtain concessions and terms which benefit them
most. 104 Moreover, voluntary settlements offer parties greater flexibility in
arriving at satisfactory resolution of disputes in situations where the parties
05
do not adequately shape arbitration before it begins. 1
Substantive review is also inconsistent with the Board's policy when
employees sue unions for breach of duty of fair representation under section
8(b) of the Act. 106 The Board's policy in fair representation cases is that a

union does not breach its duty of fair representation by a decision not to
process a grievance against an employer except in extraordinary circumstances: when the union has acted fraudulently, when it has acted with
improper motives, 107 or when it has engaged in wholly arbitrary conduct. 108 Mere negligence does not establish a breach of the union's duty to
decided promptly and intelligently without disturbing the ongoing relationship between a union and an
employer).
102. See generally Roadway Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 415,419 (4th Cir. 1981) (Board has
enunciated policy of deferral to both settlements and arbitration awards when certain criteria are met);
Combustion Engineering, 272 N.L.R.B. 215, 217 n. 13 (1984) (Board approved settlement in which
employer reinstated employee and employee forewent backpay, since both parties made concessions to
avoid arbitration) (citing Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 243 N.L.R.B. 501, 502 (1979)).
103. See, e.g., Hines, 424 U.S. at 562; Vacav. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191(1967); Central Cartage Co.,
206 N. L.R.B. 337,338 (1973) (settlement avoids time and cost of formal arbitration); see also 29 U. S.C.
§ 173(d) (1982) ("Final adjustment by method agreed upon bythe parties is... the desirable method for
settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective
bargaining agreement.").
104. See Community Medical Serv. ofClearfield, Inc. (ClearHaven Nursing Home). 236 N.L.R.B.
853,859(1978), reh'gdenied, 239 N.L.R.B. 1244 (1979) (Penello &Murphy, Members, dissenting);see
also infra note 138 and accompanying text.
105. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
106. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1982). A suit may also be brought in federal court against both a union and
an employer under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982); Vaca. 386
U.S. at 184, 186-87.
107. See Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n (Owens-Illinois, Inc.), 240 N.L.R.B. 324, 330-31 (1979)
(discrimination in refusal to bring grievances unlawful when motivated by internal union political
differences); ITT Arctic Serv., 238 N.L.R.B. 116, 116 n. 1, 123 (1978) (union officer's refusal to process
grievance because of personal animosity resulting from employee's engagement in protected activity a
breach of duty of fair representation); Pacific Coast Util. Serv., 238 N.L.R.B. 599. 599, 607-08 (1978),
enforced, NLRB v. Pacific Coast Util. Serv., Inc., 638 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1980) (union's refusal to process
grievance because of employee's intraunion activities or efforts to bring in another union constitutes
breach of duty of fair representation).
108. See U.S. Postal Serv., 240 N.L.R.B. 1198, 1199 (1979), enforced in part, NLRB v. American
Postal Workers Union, 618 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1980) (union official's refusal to support employee when
bargaining agreement and internal union policy supported employee's position a violation of duty of fair
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the employee even if the union's conduct subtantially injures the em09
ployee. 1
Employee interests in duty of fair representation cases are as significant
as their interests in unfair labor practice cases. Unions have a statutory
responsibility to protect employee rights. "10 If unions do not protect employees, employees may be unable to obtain remedies since they do not
always have the knowledge or resources to enforce their rights. "11
III.

ALTERNATIVE OF A PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS STANDARD
OF REVIEW

As an alternative to stringent substantive review, the Board should adopt
a procedural fairness standard of review. This policy would be consistent
with the purpose of the NLRA, and would further public and private
interests.
A.

Proposalfor a ProceduralFairnessStandard ofReview

Under a procedural fairness standard of review, the Board or regional
director would approve settlements absent evidence of fraud, illegality, or
duress, irrespective of the settlements' substantive terms. 112 Fraud exists
when a party intentionally misrepresents a material fact in order to procure
a settlement." 3 Duress occurs when a party uses a threat of harm or
representation); Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 579 (Beverly Manor Convalescent Center), 229
N.L.R.B. 692, 695-96 (1977) (refusal to process grievance without any inquiry into validity of stated
reason for discharge a breach of duty of fair representation).
109. See General Truck Drivers, Local 692 (Great W. Unifreight Sys.), 209 N.L.R.B. 446,447-48
(1974) (union has broad discretionary power to settle or abandon grievance, would not breach its duty of
fair representation through slight negligence or poorjudgment); see also Hines v. Anchor MotorFreight,
424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976); Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190, 192 (breach of duty of fair representation occurs only
when union's conduct towards memberof collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, orin bad
faith); Dennis, supra note 40, at 483.
110. Teamsters Local 553 (Miranda Fuel Co.), 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 188-90 (1962), enforcement
denied, NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963) (union acting as exclusive bargaining
representative has obligation to represent employees fairly, in good faith, and without discrimination on
the basis of arbitrary, irrelevant, or invidious distinctions); see also Hines,424 U.S. at 563 (unions have
authority to negotiate collective bargaining agreements, enforce procedure and settlement of employee
grievances).
111. Cf. Vaca, 386U.S. at 182(dutyoffairrepresentationaresponsetto ngressional granttounions
of power to act as exclusive collective bargaining representatives, with corresponding reduction in
individual rights of employees represented).
112. This standard has previously been proposed by Board MemberDennis. SeeArntz Contracting,
274 N.L.R.B. No. 181, at 4 (Dennis, Member, dissenting); Dennis, supra note 40, at 486.
113. See generallyLCALAMARI&J. PERILLO, THELAwOFCONTRACrS §§ 9-13 to9-15, at277-81 (2d
ed. 1977) (elements offraudulent misrepresentation include knowledge of falsity, materiality, deception,
and reliance).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 62:107, 1987

violence to induce a party to settle."14 Illegality is present when a party
threatens an illegal act to induce a settlement or when a settlement allows
for continuation of illegal acts. 115 When a challenging party establishes any
of these elements by a preponderance of the evidence, the Board would
determine whether the settlement should be rejected in light of the evidence. The Board would examine the settlement's terms, along with the
parties' allegations and evidence, to determine whether the settlement
meets the proposed standard. However, the Board would not determine a
settlement's adequacy solely on the basis of its substantive terms.
Exceptions to the procedural fairness standard of review should exist in
three instances. First, the Board should not approve a settlement which is
repugnant to the Act. Examples are settlements which permit a respondent
to continue acts that are unfair labor practices as a matter of law, or which
directly conflict with promoting harmony in the collective bargaining
process.1 1 6 This exception would overlap with the requirement that settlements be scrutinized where evidence of illegality exists.
Second, an exception should exist in cases where a charging party
objects to unilateral settlements between the regional director and the
respondent. 117 Unilateral settlements may require the Board to expend
greater resources in the appellate process than if it had originally disapproved the settlement and the parties litigated their conflict. If the Board
approves a settlement over a charging party's objection, the charging party

114. Id.. § 9-2. at 262 (duress constituted by any wrongful actor threat which overcomes freewill of
a party). Duress may sometimes exist when an employer uses its economic power to extract concessions
from a union or an employee in exchange for a settlement. However, duress would not exist when parties
arrive at settlements based on a bona fide compromise in response to disputed facts. An example of a
disputed fact situation is where an employer claims that an employee has been disciplined or fired due to
misconduct, whereas the employee argues that the employer's actions were based on the employee's union
activities. If evidence exists on both sides, no duress occurs. However, if no evidence of misconduct
exists, the employer's conditioning reinstatement on forfeit of backpay would constitute duress.
115. The Board has in the past set forth legality as a standard for settlement approval. See Retail
Clerks, Local 1288 (Nickel's Pay-Less). 163 N.L.R.B. 817, 817 n. 1 (1967) (Board found that a settlement's illegality is not cured by a charging party's consent to the settlement).
116. For examples of settlements repugnant to the Act, see Owens Corning Fiberglas Co.. 236
N.L.R.B. 479,480-81 (1978) (Board disapproved settlement which reduced termination to suspension
when employee was singled out fordrinking because of union leadership role, sinceemployer's disciplinary actions violated § 8 of Act as matter of law): Jack C. Robinson (Robinson Freight Lines). 117
N.L.R.B. 1483, 1486 (1957) (settlement failed to reinstate employees after trial judge had ordered
reinstatement because of unfair labor practice violations): Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp.. 121
N.L R.B. 1492, 1492 (1958) (Board disapproved settlement at odds with Act since it did not provide
reinstatement for unfair labor practice strikers).
117
See supra note 5 (describing unilateral settlements). The exception would not apply in the case
of a unilateral settlement to which a regional director or the General Counsel objects, since the regional
director or General Counsel does not have the right tojudicial review under § 10 ofthe Act. See infra note
119 and accompanying text.
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becomes an aggrieved party under section 10 of the Act. 118 The party is
thus entitled to judicial review before a federal court of appeals. 119 Since a
significant reason for procedural review is saving time and resources, a
different standard of review is justified. A balancing test could be used
which weighs the cost of approval against the cost of disapproval. Such a
test would involve a determination of whether more resources would be
expended in the appellate process than in litigation before the Board. 120
Finally, an exception should exist for post-trial settlements reached after
an administrative law judge has found the respondent guilty of the alleged
unfair labor practice. In such instance, the Board's presumption that the
regional director's case is meritorious is justified, at least absent error of
law.121 Substantive review is therefore appropriate to determine whether
the settlement directly contravenes the remedy granted by the trial judge.
Rather than a requirement of full statutory remedies, however, the standard
for review should be one of reasonableness. Again, the Board could employ
a balancing test. The test would weigh the cost of disapproval against the
harm to the charging party should the settlement be approved at less than
22
the judge's remedy. 1
B.

Supportfor a ProceduralFairnessStandardof Review

Many reasons exist for the Board to adopt a procedural fairness standard
of review. Procedural review would be consistent with the NLRA's purpose
123
of promoting industrial peace and encouraging collective bargaining.
Procedural review would be in the public interest since the Board would
spend fewer resources on litigation. 124 It would lead to a higher rate of
118. 29U.S.C.§ 160(f)(1982).
119. See supra note5.
120. It should be noted that a court of appeals will review aBoard final order approving ordisapproving a settlement solely underan abuse ofdiscretion standard. Airport Parking Management v. NLRB, 720
F.2d 610, 617 (9th Cir. 1983); 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1982). Thus, if settlement approval is not an abuse of
discretion, the Board will not have to expend its resources both on the appellate process and then in
litigating the dispute.
121. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
122. Factors to consider include the expenditure of the Board's and the parties' resources and the
harm to the parties' labor relations.
123. See generallyCoca Cola Co., 266 N.L.R.B. 165, 169 (1983) (settlement would avoid conflict
and controversy inevitably resulting from litigation of dispute, decrease danger of industrial conflict);
Community Medical Serv. of Clearfield County, Inc. (Clear Haven Nursing Home), 236 N.L.R.B. 853,
858 (1978), reh'gdenied, 239 N.L.R.B. 1244 (1979) (Penello & Murphy, Members, dissenting) (rejection of the settlement agreement resulted in a destructive impact on the harmony of the collective
bargaining relationship); Farmers Co-Operative Gin Ass'n, 168 N.L.R.B. 367, 367 (1967) (settlement
approval would result in early restoration of industrial harmony).
124. NLRB v. A. DuiePyle, Inc., 730F.2d 119,124(3d Cir. 1984); Coca-ColaCo., 266N.L.R.B. at
169; FarmersCo-Operative, 168 N.L.R.B. at 367; see also supranote 7.
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Board approval, as settlements would no longer be disapproved for failure
to award full statutory remedies. It would also encourage parties to settle. 125 Moreover, procedural review would be consistent with the position
adopted by the Board's General Counsel that regional directors promote
voluntary settlement of unfair labor practice disputes whenever possible. 126
A procedural fairness standard of review would also benefit private parties. Parties would not spend resources on litigation when settlements are
disapproved based on their substantive terms.1 27 Further, procedural review
would minimize economic dislocation among employers and employees in
cases involving strikes or lockouts. 128 At present, parties whose settlements
are rejected might have to wait years before resolving disputes through
litigation. 129 Procedural review would also give parties whose settlements
are approved more certain remedies than they would obtain by litigating their
disputes. 130 The parties would not have to risk losing at a hearing or on
appeal; rather, each would be free to obtain at least part of what it wants by
settling. 131 Finally, those parties who cannot voluntarily settle their disputes
would have greater access to the Board's dispute resolution resources. 132
In addition, procedural review would be consistent with the negotiation
process. Negotiation entails each side's use of its respective bargaining
125.

Cf supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text (discussing the negotiation process).

See General Counsel Memorandum 78-41, July 6, 1978, in LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK1978, at 328-29 (1979).
127. Although the regional director and not the charging party actually litigates the case against a
respondent, unions oremployers who have filed unfair laborpractice charges will normally be represented
by counsel. They often have significant interests at stake and they may lose everything, including what
they otherwise would have gained by a proposed settlement, in litigation.
128. See Clear Haven Nursing Home, 236 N.L.R.B. at 858 (1978) (Penello & Murphy, Members,
dissenting) (rejection of settlement would result in disruption of individual parties' lives, since labor
contract became void, employees lost the higher wages and benefits provided for in the contract and
instead were forced to continue strike).
129. See, e.g., Carpenters 46 N. Cal. Counties Conference Bd. (Arntz Contracting), 274 N.L.R.B.
No. 181 at6, 118 L.R.R.M. 1588, later proceeding, 277 N.L.R.B. No. 30,121 L.R.R.M. 1030 (1985)
(Dennis, Member, dissenting) (litigating a dispute might require four or five years); Coca Cola Co., 266
N.L.R.B. at 169 (settlement would more quickly remedy wrong, allow employees expeditiously to
pursue rights guaranteed by Act).
126.

130. See Clear Haven Nursing Home, 236 N.L.R.B. at 857-58 (Penello & Murphy, Members,
dissenting) (settlement would have provided certain outcome by ensuring the employees' return to work.
whereas litigation could result at most in Board order to bargain in good faith); Coca Cola Co., 266
N.L.R.B. at 169 (approval of settlement would reduce uncertainty confronting parties by providing for
union election); FarmersCo-Operative, 168 N.L.R.B. at 367-68 (settlement approved in light of risk of
litigation, which may be lost in whole or in part); see alsoArntz Contracting, 274 N.L.R.B. No. 181 at 8
(Dennis, Member, dissenting) (in rejecting settlement the Board failed to consider the risk in litigation
that the General Counsel might not prevail on the merits, or might win less in a hearing oron appeal than
had been obtained in the proferred agreement).
13 1. See infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
132. NLRB v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 730 F.2d 119, 124 (3d Cir. 1984) (in face of backlog ofBoard cases
and resulting delay, time expended to adjudicate a "settled" dispute could be better used to resolve
controversies of genuine interest to parties); Bioff, supra note 25, at 300-01.
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strengths to extract favorable concessions from the other side. Under the
NLRA, neither the Board nor the courts impose their view of desirable
advansettlements in collective bargaining negotiations. 133 The bargaining
34 ThUS, it
1
relationship.
labor
particular
a
in
tages which exist are inherent
is inappropriate for the Board to scrutinize the terms of unfair labor practice
settlements beyond circumstances of fraud, illegality, or duress. 135 The
Board recognized the fairness of the negotiation process by adopting an
36
internal policy of favoring settlements early in the history of the NLRA. 1
Procedural review would give parties flexibility in arriving at a satisfactory resolution of disputes. 137 Parties would be able to structure their own
remedies, bargaining for terms which maximize their respective interests. 138 The Board would not impose its own criteria for whether settlements adequately remedy alleged unfair labor practices.

133. See NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395,404 (1952); NLRB v. Tomco Communications, Inc., 567 F.2d 871, 884 (9th Cir. 1978) (Board may not dictate substantive terms of collective
bargaining agreements); see also supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
134. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 317-18 (1965) (use of lockout as
economic weapon by employer to improve bargaining position not an unfair labor practice); NLRB v.
InsuranceAgentslnt'lUnion, 361U.S. 477,487,489 (1960) (section 8(d) ofActwas attemptbyCongress
to prevent Board from controlling terms of collective bargaining agreements-existence and use of
economic weapons part and parcel of system that labor laws recognized).
135. One purpose ofthe labor laws is to mitigate inequality of bargaining positions between parties.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text. However, the NLRA accomplishes this purpose by requiring
that parties undertake collective bargaining, not by forcing parties to accept labor contract terms. H.K.
Porter v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 106 (1970). A procedural fairness standard for approval of unfair labor
practice disputes is consistent with the Court's statement in Porterthat the Board acts to oversee the
process of collective bargaining, leaving the results of contests to the bargaining strengths of the parties.
Id. at 107.
136. Seesupranote7(NLRB has longstanding policy of encouraging settlements); cf Community
Medical Serv. of Clearfield, Inc. (Clear Haven Nursing Home), 236 N.L.R.B. 853, 859 (1978), reh'g
denied, 239 N.L.R.B. 1244 (1979) (Penello & Murphy, Members, dissenting) (by entering settlement
respondent showed good faith in attempting to meet its obligation under Act without compulsion of
Board).
137. See R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 83, at 58-83 (on inventing options for mutual gain); N.
JAcKER, supra note 87, at 3. Labor negotiations are not pure bargaining in which one party always loses
when the other side gains, but bargaining in which parties can experience mutual gains. C. STEVENS,
supra note 87, at 10 (collective bargaining is "mixed" or symbiotic relationship-parties gain by
cooperation to extent of preserving the relationship, but elements ofcompetition also exist over" terms of
trade" upon which cooperation shall takeplace); cf Schelling,AnEssayonBargaining,XLVI AM. ECON.
REV. 281, 281 (1956) (distinguishing pure negotiation from exploring for mutually profitable adjustments, the "efficiency" aspect of bargaining).
138. See. e.g., CocaCola Co., 266N.L.R.B. 165,166(1983) (settlementwhichresolvedunfairlabor
practice issues and provided for election of bargaining representatives was inseparable package, since
parties would have agreed on neither portion of the settlement had the otherportion been withheld); Clear
Haven Nursing Home, 236 N.L.R.B. at 857 (Penello & Murphy, Members, dissenting) (settlement
awarded greater remedy-collective bargaining agreement-than union could possibly have obtained
through litigation).
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Procedural review would also be consistent with the frequent need in
labor relations for many parties to reach agreement together. 139 Under this
circumstance, all parties must agree for the parties to reach a compromise,
while to prevent agreement only one party need disagree. Settlements
correspondingly take more effort and are more difficult to obtain. 140
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Board's current policy of substantive review is inconsistent with the
NLRA's purpose to promote industrial peace by encouraging collective
bargaining. In addition, the Board's historical and legal justifications for
substantive review are flawed. Substantive review is unrealistic in terms of
the negotiation process and is inconsistent with other Board policies.
Finally, substantive review results in waste of public and private resources
spent litigating disputes.
The Board should adopt a procedural fairness standard of review for
deciding whether to approve unfair labor practice settlements. Under such a
standard, the Board would approve settlements with which a charging party
agrees, and which do not directly contravene a remedy granted by an
administrative law judge, absent evidence of fraud, coercion, or illegality.
A procedural review standard would be consistent with the NLRA's purpose to promote collective bargaining because it would encourage parties
to settle labor disputes voluntarily and to continue the collective bargaining
process. A procedural standard would also promote fast and efficient
resolution of disputes. Finally, adoption of procedural review would be
consistent with the negotiation process because it would recognize the
fairness of negotiation and provide parties the flexibility to maximize their
respective interests and needs. By adopting a procedural fairness standard
of review, the Board would promote the goal which the Supreme Court
recognized as a significant purpose behind the collective bargaining process-creating a "system of industrial self-government." 141
Andrew F. Fuller

139. See, e.g., Carpenters 46 N. Cal. Counties Conference Bd. (Arntz Contracting), 274 N.L.R.B.
No. 181 at 5, 118 L.R.R.M. 1588, later proceeding, 277 N.L.R.B. No. 30,121 L.R.R.M. 1030 (1985)

(Dennis, Member, dissenting) (settlement agreement negotiated between 10 respondents and 45 charging
parties).
140.

See R. FisHER & W. URY, supra note 83, at 7-8 (agreements are more difficult to reach when

many parties are involved in negotiations since all parties must agree to achieve adesired outcome, while
only one party need disagree to prevent the outcome).
141. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.. 363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960).

